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Introduction 
Since the beginning of the modern age, there have been political thinkers who complain about its 
over-emphasis on the individual. Others have raised concerns about the dangers associated with 
too much community. One version of this dispute is reflected in the ‘liberal-communitarian 
debate’, which arose within anglophone political philosophy during the 1980s. The liberals were 
led by John Rawls, along with Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Nagel, and T.M. Scanlon. And the 
communitarian critique of their work was advanced by, among others, Alasdair MacIntyre, 
Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor, and Michael Walzer. As we might expect, since the publication 
of the writings of both groups, some have seen fit to declare one side or other of the debate the 
victor. But we should assume that none of the leading participants saw their exchanges in such 
merely competitive terms. After all, serious thinkers know that theirs is a higher – because 
ultimately philosophical – calling. 
We can understand the debate as arising primarily around Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (1999; 
originally published in 1971). The book defends what he considers to be the key principles of 
liberalism. To Rawls, we should endorse that political order which matches what rational citizens 
would freely choose from ‘the original position’. This is the perspective attained by stepping 
behind a hypothetical ‘veil of ignorance’, which conceals individuals’ knowledge of their 
capacities or social position. By imagining ourselves behind such a veil, we are said to be able to 
deliberate in a truly representative manner, and so ‘regard the human situation not only from all 
social but also from all temporal points of view’ (Rawls 1999: 514). In this way, we can formulate 
principles of justice that provide the basis for a universally acceptable social contract. 
Such a universalist approach, however, is just one of two routes to the liberalism Rawls 
offers in the book. He also thinks we can reach a conception of justice through a process of 
‘reflective equilibrium’. It requires starting from − and remaining connected to – actual liberal 
societies. By conceiving of their practices as reflecting considered judgments that can serve as 
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provisional fixed points, Rawls believes we can reformulate them in a more systematically unified 
manner. Indeed, by tacking back and forth, from practice to theory and back again, he thinks we 
will eventually arrive at the very same principles of justice derived from the original position. 
Communitarians tended to focus on Rawls’ universalist case for liberalism, critiquing it 
along two basic lines. First, they argued that the original position is simply impossible. To achieve 
the necessary detachment, all of our ends would have to be matters of choice. But this relies on an 
“atomist” (Taylor 1985) or “unencumbered” (Sandel 1998: 90, 172, 178–79; 2005) conception of 
the self, one that is simply not ontologically accurate. Second, communitarians held that, even if 
attainable, such detachment would be undesirable. This is because it is compatible with only 
individualistic ends, and so would undermine those social practices that need to be carried out in 
common with others – from friendship and family to broader forms of community. One reason for 
this is that universalist principles are simply too abstract to move ordinary citizens. 
Rawls responded with ‘Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical’ (1985), a paper 
largely included in the first chapter of his Political Liberalism (1993). In this work, Rawls 
downplays the original position, characterizing it as no more than an illustrative device, and 
emphasizes reflective equilibrium instead (now also called ‘Kantian constructivism’). Rawls also 
stipulates that this approach never assumes we should, or even could, choose our life plans ex 
nihilo. We may simply evaluate some of our ends in the light of others, treating none as anything 
more than provisional fixed points. He also denies asserting any particular conception of the self. 
To Rawls, since such questions are ontological, hence metaphysical, they fall outside the scope of 
his strictly ‘political’ approach. This is why it needs to be distinguished from those that are based 
on ‘comprehensive’ worldviews.  
Since we achieve reflective equilibrium through a more systematic formulation of the 
principles already underpinning liberal democratic regimes’ public political cultures, Rawls 
believes that the vision of justice derived from it can be upheld by the members of many different 
communities and ways of life. After all, they already coexist more or less reasonably within these 
regimes. So Rawls takes such a shared political ideal to represent a unified ‘overlapping 
consensus’, one detachable from those parts of citizens’ lives not relevant to politics. The latter 
are what are captured by comprehensive views that, as we might expect, will remain divergent. 
This approach has led some to describe Rawls and other ‘political liberals’ (e.g. Larmore 




reformulating they favour is indeed a form of interpretation. However, it is too ‘theoretical’ to 
align with the contemporary hermeneutics associated with figures such as Hans-Georg Gadamer 
(1989). Rawls aims to reach a stable resting point: a theory of justice capable of guiding political 
practice. But hermeneutical interpretation is usually portrayed as ongoing – as always on ‘the way’ 
(to borrow an expression from Gadamer’s teacher, Martin Heidegger [2008]; see also Gadamer 
1981: 105).  
So while hermeneutical social critics also aim for better interpretations of political justice, 
they don’t seek fixed and systematic principles. Hermeneutics entails a thoroughly contextual form 
of judgment that is ‘practical’ rather than ‘theoretical’ (Dreyfus 2014). We might even say that its 
practitioners should avoid any talk of principles (Dancy 2004). This also helps clarify why we 
shouldn’t conflate the exchange of hermeneutical interpretations with the dialogues envisioned by 
deliberative democrats. To the latter, interlocutors must conform to pre-conceived theoretical 
frameworks if they are to make contributions to ‘public reason’ (Rawls) or ‘communicative action’ 
(Jürgen Habermas). 
In time, the debate between liberals and communitarians both dissolved and ramified. The 
dissolution accompanied a growing recognition that most of the ‘communitarians’ actually reject 
the label (except, notably, Daniel Bell 1993). Many even consider themselves liberals of a sort, 
including Taylor and Walzer. And as Taylor (1985: 195) along with Sandel (1998: 149) have 
acknowledged, the debate’s liberals have themselves come to embrace their own conceptions of 
community (e.g. Dworkin 2002: ch. 5). In fact, since then, four distinct-but-related new strands of 
liberalism have emerged. Shaped by other recent foci of contemporary anglophone political 
philosophy – including deliberative democracy, human and animal rights, postcolonialism, and 
national, global, and environmental justice – we might refer to them collectively as ‘liberalism 
after communitarianism’. 
 
Liberalism as an Ideology 
Whether or not they consider their theories of justice as universally applicable, liberals such as 
Rawls have consistently viewed them as providing a neutral framework: a conception of right 
within which citizens may pursue their different and often rival conceptions of the good. This 
accords with such popular expressions as ‘liberal democracy’ as well as their implication that 




on par with those such as conservatism, socialism, feminism, environmentalism, and so on. This 
is why Dworkin (2006: 7), for example, has been able to unselfconsciously propose that US liberals 
and conservatives confront one another politically on an explicitly liberal common ground.  
However, those who conceive of liberalism as an ideological ‘fighting creed’ (Taylor 1995b: 
249) generally oppose the separation of the right from the good. So rather than neutrality, they 
favour what is sometimes called a ‘perfectionist’ state. They likewise reject the thoroughly 
pejorative, Marxist-inspired notion of ideology as nothing more than a mask for material or other 
interests. To Michael Freeden (1996: 3), for instance, an ideology is simply a way of ‘political 
thinking, loose or rigid, deliberate or unintended, through which individuals and groups construct 
an understanding of the political world they, or those who preoccupy their thoughts, inhabit, and 
then act on that understanding’.  
Freeden is the leading student of liberalism as an ideology today. His morphological 
approach focuses on the evolving meanings and configurations of political concepts, sensitizing 
him to liberalism’s many forms. Noting the variety of ways that its core, adjacent, and peripheral 
concepts have been identified, related, and decontested, his work underscores how liberalism’s 
meanings have differed not only between countries but also throughout history (Freeden 1996, 
2005, 2008). So while he is surely aware of how the American variant, the one that attracted most 
communitarian criticisms, has served to inspire many beleaguered liberals around the world, he 
has nevertheless also complained about its relatively inward-looking, ahistorical, narrow, and 
impoverished qualities. This has been accompanied by his compelling accounts of liberalisms that 
avoid such depoliticization and over-emphasis on individual rights, and so make more room for 
shared concerns with well-being and social solidarity  
However, Freeden’s approach is also overly ‘analytical’, by which I mean insufficiently 
holistic. His accounts of ideologies in general, and liberalism in particular, mainly consist of 
‘assembling’ – of moving ‘from concepts to ideologies’, as one of his chapter titles puts it (Freeden 
1996: ch. 2). But hermeneutics teaches that we should always begin the other way around, that is, 
with the whole rather than with its parts. Given normative concepts’ ongoing connection with 
broader ideological backgrounds, properly conceptualizing an ideology’s parts means that we 
should also continually strive to take account of the whole.  
Freeden does occasionally begin writing about a political thinker by generally characterizing 




concepts, he rarely brings that broader doctrinal context to bear. And more often than not, he opens 
with a concept-by-concept account of the ideology’s core. So while Freeden’s studies sensitively 
capture how adjacent concepts can shape each others’ meanings, both logically and culturally, he 
neglects the parallel relationships that connect them to the broader doctrine. For example, he refers 
to how L.T. Hobhouse sums-up his liberalism: 
 
The heart of liberalism is the understanding that progress is not a matter of mechanical 
contrivance, but of the liberation of living spiritual energy. Good mechanism is that 
which provides the channels wherein such energy can flow unimpeded, unobstructed 
by its own exuberance of output, vivifying the social structure, expanding and 
ennobling the life of mind (Hobhouse 1964: 73; quoted in Freeden 2005: 25). 
 
Yet while noting that this summation ‘informs’ Hobhouse’s particular understandings of ‘the core 
liberal concepts of liberty, rationality, progress, individuality, sociability, a common good, limited 
and responsible power’ (2005: 25–26), Freeden has little more to say about the matter. 
Moreover, while he decries the ostensive neutrality of liberalism’s American variant, he 
assumes ideologies should be studied without judging them as better or worse. But can we really 
understand an ideology without considering how it measures up to any broader norms the 
community might share, e.g. of justice or truth? Contemporary hermeneutics says no. It is certainly 
often possible to describe without prescribing, as when saying ‘This is a chair’. But that is simply 
infeasible when it comes to moral and political concepts: they necessarily implicate our self-
understandings, raising questions about nothing less than who we are (Taylor 1988). 
In that sense, Freeden’s approach takes him to the opposite extreme as Marxists. He simply 
does not have much to say about the limitations of ideological thinking (Freeden 2009 being a 
notable exception). Indeed, he seems far from impressed by longstanding complaints that such 
fighting creeds tend to encourage dogmatic attitudes (e.g. Namier 1955: 5–7) – or that ideological 
inflexibility often accompanies overly adversarial responses to political conflict. I include here 
responding with force rather than dialogue, of course, but also being unduly adversarial in 
exchanges that stop short of violence. Ideologies may indeed help guide us through high-stakes 




conflict with open-minded conversation rather than with negotiation (Blattberg 2009a). More on 
this below. 
 
Liberalism in the Face of Diversity: Autonomy 
First, however, I want to discuss another major development since the liberal-communitarian 
debate. It has seen liberals increasingly strive to more sensitively account for Western societies’ 
significant diversity, as well as the identity-related challenges this can entail. Focusing particularly 
on the place of minority populations, for instance, many recent liberal thinkers have taken one of 
two approaches. 
There is the defence of a perfectionist liberalism − a liberalism, again, of the good and not 
merely the right. Such views gather around a particular conception of individual freedom. Needless 
to say, this core liberal value has had many rival interpretations, advanced under labels including 
‘negative freedom’, ‘self-ownership’, ‘experiments in living’, ‘authenticity’, and ‘non-
domination’. Perfectionist liberals tend to favour ‘autonomy’, however.  
Of course, this term is also central to Immanuel Kant’s account, according to which 
individual liberty should be equated with morality as a whole, understood as consisting of self-
determined principles. To many perfectionist liberals, however, ‘autonomy’ expresses individuals’ 
freedom to choose between different ways of life. Understood in this way, the idea plays a minor 
if significant role in Walzer’s liberalism. For him, the ‘autonomous person . . . . [is] the ideal 
subject of the theory of justice’, since citizens should be able to choose to participate in the various 
institutions, associations, or distributive spheres present in modern society (Walzer 1983: 279; 
2007a). Yet autonomy as the ability to choose is front and centre in the liberalisms of Joseph Raz 
and Will Kymlicka.1 
They consider their approaches especially appropriate for multicultural societies, helping 
address a shortcoming that attracted communitarian critique. Although older conceptions of 
liberalism purport to be neutral among different cultural groups, Raz and Kymlicka argue that they 
are often ‘implicitly tilted towards the needs, interests, and identities of the majority group; and 
this creates a range of burdens, barriers, stigmatizations, and exclusions for members of minority 
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groups’ (Kymlicka and Norman 2000: 4). Such older perspectives, in fact, tend to see ethnocultural 
or national minorities as potential threats to the liberal polity’s unity.  
Raz and Kymlicka’s alternative gives priority to a greater respect for diversity. Not that 
citizens’ motivations need to be in any sense altruistic: as Raz puts it, for instance, ‘the conditions 
of autonomy require an environment rich in possibilities’ (Raz 1994: 107; see also Raz 1986: chs. 
14–15; Kymlicka 1995: chs. 5, 8; and Kymlicka 2002: ch. 6). Otherwise put, if freedom is indeed 
a matter of choosing, then there must be an adequate range of options to choose from. Raz, and 
Kymlicka after him, therefore argue that ethnic or national minorities should be seen as making an 
invaluable contribution by broadening cultural options for people – so long, that is, as they do so 
within a framework that respects autonomy. 
But is autonomy really the best way to conceive of individual liberty? Raz recommends it as 
an ideal particularly suited to the often-changing conditions of contemporary society (1986: 370). 
And Kymlicka sees it as virtually entailed by both modernization and globalization (2002: 369). 
However, this emphasis on choice also points towards one of modern society’s least-attractive 
features: consumerism. So the association makes it hard not to question Raz’s claim that it is 
through our choices that we best define our morality. To Raz, autonomy requires ‘morally 
acceptable options’ (1986: 378). One might object, though, that we often don’t really conceive of 
a moral action as optional. For we simply could not choose otherwise and remain true to ourselves 
(a way of talking that, admittedly, betrays sympathy for the conception of individual liberty as 
‘authenticity’). 
The danger of understanding individual freedom as making choices, then, is trivialization. 
As Taylor has written of the word ‘choice’, it ‘occludes almost everything important: the sacrificed 
alternatives in a dilemmatic situation, and the real moral weight of the situation’ (2007: 479). The 
idea of ‘options’ is equally problematic, since it suggests a number of independently distinct items 
to choose from. At least according to accounts of perception derived from hermeneutical 
phenomenology (e.g. Merleau-Ponty 2012), moral reality is once again usually much more 
holistic. For one thing, it tends to be a matter of shades and degrees. For another, which choices 
we interpret as possible, and how, remain intimately related to us as a whole; after all, they express 
the values that help constitute our identities. 
To Kymlicka, however, the capacity to weigh such moral possibilities is central. We can 




“stand apart” or “step back” from our current ends, and question their value to us’ (Kymlicka 2002: 
215, though see 278n2). Yet is such disengagement really necessary for criticism? 
 
Liberalism in the Face of Diversity: Value Pluralism 
To value pluralists such as Isaiah Berlin, Stuart Hampshire, John Kekes, and Bernard Williams, 
the answer would be ‘no’. They not only reject neutralist forms of liberalism, but their conception 
of the diversity of values also leads them to a view of practical reason, and so criticism, that wholly 
avoids disengagement, not to mention the belief that liberalism relies on a foundationalist 
conception of autonomy. Each approach is, in its own way, guilty of monism. 
To these pluralists, moral and political conflicts frequently arise from the existence of 
incommensurable values, which are often at odds. And their incommensurability means that we 
cannot respond to such conflicts by turning to an abstract, systematic theory for guidance, whether 
neutralist or perfectionist. Such theories assume that all values have been commensurated, in the 
loose sense of interlocked within a unified system. But this is simply impossible without seriously 
distorting them, and by extension the different ways of life they express. Moreover, such theories 
also serve to ‘shelter’ certain values from the vicissitudes of everyday politics, placing them 
beyond compromise. Yet this tends only to make the conflicts involving them worse. 
So value pluralists emphasize instead how people in conflict should usually be willing to 
negotiate in good faith. This means being open to making concessions, since that’s often the only 
way to reach a balanced accommodation. Not only may we not share the same values – or 
interpretations of them – as those with whom we find ourselves in conflict, but we should also 
consider their values as genuine. After all, it’s not their ‘fault’ they were raised differently than we 
were. In consequence, because they, too, are moral agents, deserving a certain minimum of respect, 
we ought to tolerate them to some degree, and thereby make at least some concessions for reasons 
other than that we feel forced to do so. 
But what concessions, exactly? And how much should we concede? Value pluralists may be 
said to turn here for guidance to ideologies, which call on us to assign different values different 
weights. As we might expect, there is far from a consensus between them over which specific 
ideology, and so which particular ranking of values, deserves our support. This is why, crudely 
put, liberals such as Berlin and Williams would have us favour individual liberty, socialists such 




Regardless of the value they happen to cherish most, however, all value pluralists agree that we 
cannot award it a trumping status: no value is absolute. This is especially evident when conflicts 
arise between the values favoured by one’s preferred ideology. So we can understand why all 
pluralist liberals can be said to agree with William Galston (1991: 195) that ‘liberalism is a basket 
of ideals that inevitably come into conflict with one another if a serious effort is made to realize any 
one of them fully, let alone all of them simultaneously’. 
Evidently, this liberalism is quite different from Raz or Kymlicka’s: its fulcrum is toleration, 
not autonomy. While Raz claims to subscribe to value pluralism, he does so not because he sees it 
as true to the moral reality, so much as a way of serving autonomy. For he argues that toleration 
should be subservient to autonomy (1986: 407). As for Kymlicka, he conceives of autonomy and 
toleration as but ‘two sides of the same coin’, which is why he, too, will not countenance any 
compromise of the former in favour of the latter (2002: 231, 245). 
Liberals who affirm value pluralism cannot accept this, and not only because of their great 
emphasis on toleration. There’s also a deeper, philosophical reason. I already mentioned how 
recognizing a plurality of conflicting and incommensurable values leads them to reject systematic 
theories of justice in favour of negotiation. But this also implies that deciding on which ideology 
to favour for guidance cannot itself be a philosophical matter. The reason is that there is simply no 
way to derive moral guidance from the mere recognition of disunity, from the belief that we live 
in a world ‘where ends collide’ (Berlin 2013a: 195; and see Blattberg 2009a). In consequence, 
value pluralists turn instead to interpretations of the political culture in which they find themselves, 
‘the general pattern of life in which we believe’ (Berlin 2002: 47; see also 42, and Berlin 2013b: 
19). 
Since it makes no sense to try and go from pluralism-in-itself to any particular ideology, 
Berlin has come to assert that ‘Pluralism and liberalism are not the same or even overlapping 
concepts. There are liberal theories which are not pluralistic. I believe in both liberalism and 
pluralism, but they are not logically connected’ (Berlin and Jahanbegloo 1991: 44; see also Berlin 
and Williams 1994: 308–309). Of course, Berlin’s earlier writings have been read as providing 
evidence he supported the opposite position (e.g. Gray 2013: ch. 6), referring, for instance, to his 
claim that there exists a more-or-less unbreachable minimal private sphere of individual liberty. 
But is this sufficient to support a full-blown liberalism? Consider what we might identify as the 




offending against the essence of his human nature’. However, doesn’t this contrast sharply with the 
‘extreme demand for liberty’ made by the fathers of liberalism, they who, evidently, ‘want more 
than this minimum’ (Berlin 2002: 173, 207)? 
In any case, my main objection to this liberalism – indeed, to any value pluralist politics – is 
with the priority it places on negotiation; more specifically, with the way this emphasis often 
precludes the non-adversarial form of dialogue that is conversation. Rather than negotiating 
accommodations, conversational interlocutors cooperate in an attempt to integrate their conflicting 
values. The goal is thus something more than negotiation’s zero-sum compromising, which 
balances conflicting values against one another. It is because participants in a conversation assume 
that their values are parts of a shared whole – the common good – that they may attempt a 
reconciliation of their conflict rather than a mere accommodation. Indeed, by striving for 
synergistic solutions, they can learn from one another – not about the most effective ways to put 
pressure on their adversaries, nor about how much they should be compromising, but about how 
to realize and further develop all of the values at stake. 
This approach is especially vital when it comes to ‘the politics of recognition’, when 
conflicts have arisen over a group’s wish to be recognized (usually by the state) for its 
distinctiveness within the polity. Recognition is a matter of knowledge, and so truth – something 
the German and French words for it, Anerkennung and reconnaissance, make especially clear. And 
since one either learns that something is true or does not – this being not the kind of thing that 
could be up for negotiation – conversation is the only form of dialogue that has the potential to 
bring such recognition. 
Despite this, thinkers often discuss the politics of recognition as consisting of ‘struggles’ 
over ‘demands’ (e.g. Honneth 1995; Taylor 1995b: 225). The problem here is that conversation is 
only viable when conflicts are considered ‘oppositional’ but not ‘adversarial’ (Blattberg 2009b). 
After all, anyone hoping to converse with someone who is willing only to negotiate will quickly 
realize that conversation is impossible. Moreover, on a deeper level, because adversarial 
conceptions of conflict also generally assume some ‘clash’ or ‘collision’ of values, and because 
this results from a view of values as separate, independently distinct things, any assumption that 
those involved could share some larger whole will be undermined – and along with it any hope for 




So we should not be surprised by the many references in value pluralist writings to dirty 
hands and even tragedy (e.g. Berlin 2002: 200, 214; Hampshire 1989: 170–77; Williams 1981). 
When politics consists at best of making compromises, everyone must expect to lose something of 
value. Lacking a conception of the whole, value pluralists thus end up with a politics from which 
there is nothing to gain, much less to learn (Blattberg 2000). 
 
Fearful Liberalism 
Communitarians, Judith N. Shklar has complained, fail to appreciate the extent to which liberalism, 
as a matter of practice, has provided them with the luxury of worrying about the nature of the self. 
And those worries are, in any case, distractions at best; at worst, they can lead people to do real 
damage to those very same practices (Shklar 1998a: 17–18). 
So we can see why Shklar came to defend what she calls a ‘liberalism of fear’. Like almost 
all liberalisms, it gives the greatest possible weight to individual liberty. But hers is unique in being 
based on neither a theory of justice, nor an architectonic conception of personal freedom as 
autonomy, nor a pluralist-driven affirmation of toleration. Rather, it starts from the claim that 
‘cruelty is an absolute evil’ and that the ‘willful inflicting of physical pain on a weaker being in 
order to cause anguish and fear’ is a fundamental infringement on liberty (Shklar 1998a: 5; 1984: 
8). Liberals, Shklar thus believes, should recognize that the key division within the political world 
is the one between the weak and the strong, and that only by protecting the former from the latter 
can we be said to ‘put cruelty first’ (Shklar 1998a: 9, 19).  
As mentioned, she doesn’t derive this norm from a moral theory (Shklar 1998a: 12). So she 
recognizes that we cannot hope to uphold it consistently, as monists assume, since any attempt to 
do so will encounter contradictions. This means we should reject those readings of her work that 
portray Shklar as a monist (e.g. Fives 2020). But nor should we go along with those who consider 
her a pluralist (e.g. Misra 2016: 78, 80, 87). Because where pluralists assume that there exists no 
singular, all-embracing summum, Shklar’s belief that cruelty is the summum malum is, as we’ve 
seen, central to her liberalism (Shklar 1998a: 10–11). 
Paradoxically, then, her approach can be understood to combine elements of both monism 
and pluralism, forming what we might call a ‘pluramonism’. Indeed, Shklar has taken note of 
Walzer’s adoption of a similar metaphysics: she describes his work as ‘self-divided’ (Shklar 




override justice, even though this means ‘dirtying’ our hands (Walzer 2007b).2 But Shklar seems 
to overlook her own pluramonism. For example, she appears to see nothing contradictory about, 
on the one hand, issuing a monistic call on individuals to ‘submit to a single system of law equally 
applicable to all’, since ‘it is only the modern state, with its unified legal system, that provides the 
necessary framework within which voluntary associations can form’, while, on the other hand, 
confidently declaring that ‘the enemy of any pluralism is monopoly and the domination it yields’ 
(Shklar 1998b: 385, 382). 
In fact, Shklar’s pluramonism was there from the beginning. In 1964, one of her first books 
attempts ‘to account for the difficulties which the morality of justice faces in a morally pluralistic 
world’ – ‘morality of justice’ is clearly monist, while ‘morally pluralistic world’ is, of course, 
pluralist (Shklar 1986: 123). The book likewise tells us both that ‘human institutions survive 
because most of us can live quite comfortably with wholly contradictory beliefs’, and that we 
sometimes face a ‘difficult choice among a variety of equally valid obligations’ (Shklar 1986: x, 
73). So when Shklar (1984: ch. 2) argues in a later work against considering hypocrisy as the worst 
political vice, her analysis sometimes seems to veer into apology. This is only to be expected, since 
while hypocrisy is deemed unnecessary by the pluralist and intolerable by the monist, to the 
pluramonist it will tend to appear as both unavoidable and tolerable. 
Why has Shklar’s liberalism of fear attracted such interest now, decades after her original 
essay’s publication? One reason must surely be that people have been drawn to how her profound 
concern with cruelty has led her to be especially mindful about the ongoing effects of slavery in 
America, for instance, or about refugees, women, and other disproportionately vulnerable groups. 
While some have always been struck by the urgent need to right these injustices, today’s increased 
sensitivity to suffering has meant that they have been joined by others – all of whom, together, can 
be expected to view political thinking that makes security a central concern as very compelling. 
Richard Rorty, who has endorsed Shklar’s definition of liberalism (Rorty 1989: xv), foreshadowed 
this development when he praised the significant reduction in the psychological humiliation of the 
weak that attends it, although he has simultaneously rightly decried the failure to do much about 
the steady increase in economic insecurity that has accompanied it (Rorty 1998: 79–85). Others, 
however, have worried that too great a concern with security in whatever form may be counter-
                                               




productive; one reaction to the ideas of Thomas Hobbes, for instance, has been to note that the 
‘search for perfect security . . . defeats its own ends. Playing for safety is the most dangerous way 
to live’ (Lindsay 1950: xxvii). Could the relative minimalism of Shklar’s approach mean that her 
liberalism is ultimately less effective at meeting its own strictly mitigating ends than more 
ambitious forms of it? I, for one, think so. 
 
Conclusion 
Like all ideologies, liberalism will continue to evolve. Identifying how it should do so will, 
needless to say, remain a central challenge for liberals of all sorts. When it comes to their 
extramural struggles, though, it seems to me that, before confronting others who support different 
ideologies in an adversarial way, liberals should try to engage them in conversation. Doing so 
properly, however, means listening to what they have to say rather than to some preconceived 
doctrine such as an ideology – including the ideology of liberalism. What I am suggesting is that, 
if liberals are genuinely to approach their fellow citizens with open minds whenever there’s a 
conflict, then they must set aside their liberalism, if only for a time. For that is what the common 
good requires. Perhaps, then, this is communitarianism’s greatest lesson.
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